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Abstract
This paper studies the equilibrium price of an asset that is traded
in continuous time between N agents who have heterogeneous be-
liefs about the state process underlying the asset’s payoff. We pro-
pose a tractable model where agents maximize expected returns under
quadratic costs on inventories and trading rates. The unique equi-
librium price is characterized by a weakly coupled system of linear
parabolic equations which shows that holding and liquidity costs play
dual roles. We derive the leading-order asymptotics for small transac-
tion and holding costs which give further insight into the equilibrium
and the consequences of illiquidity.
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1 Introduction
Heterogeneous beliefs about fundamental values are a key motive for trade
in financial markets. Accordingly, a rich literature studies how prices form as
the aggregate of subjective beliefs; see e.g. the survey [38] for numerous ref-
erences. This synthesis happens by means of trading: agents with lower indi-
vidual valuations sell to agents who are more optimistic about fundamentals.
Hence, liquidity—the ease with which trades can be implemented—plays an
important role in determining how beliefs are reflected in prices.
In the present study, we propose a tractable model that allows us to
study the interplay of heterogeneous beliefs and liquidity in determining
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asset prices. We consider N (types of) agents who have different beliefs
about the state process determining the payoff of a given asset. They trade
the asset in continuous time to maximize their expected returns, penalized
with quadratic costs on inventories and trading rates. We show that this
model admits a unique Markovian equilibrium. The equilibrium price is
characterized as the solution of a linear system of parabolic equations with
a weak coupling (i.e., the equations are coupled only through the zeroth-order
terms). The solution, as well as the necessary estimates on its derivatives, are
obtained by combining a fixed-point argument of [8] for reaction–diffusion
equations, classical Schauder theory for parabolic equations and a gradient
estimate that seems to be novel.
This characterization allows us to study the influence of the two costs.
The holding costs on inventories, parametrized by a coefficient γ, can be
seen as a proxy for risk aversion, whereas the costs on the trading rate,
with coefficient λ > 0, stand in for the liquidity (or transaction) cost caused
by market impact. The two costs determine how agents take into account
current and future expected returns when choosing their portfolios: with
bigger transaction costs, further weight is placed on future market conditions
to avoid trades likely to be reversed later on. Conversely, larger holding costs
make it less appealing to hold a given position, so that the current trading
opportunities play a bigger role. Accordingly, liquidity and holding costs
play inverse roles in our analysis. Specifically, when the asset is in zero net
supply (a natural assumption for derivative contracts, say) the two costs
only enter through their ratio γ/λ. For a positive supply, the asset price
remains invariant if the inverse of the supply is rescaled in the same manner
as transaction and holding costs, so that the larger trading and holding costs
of bigger asset positions are offset by reducing both frictions.
Explicit asymptotic formulas obtain in the limiting regimes where either
transaction costs or holding costs are small (γ/λ ≈ ∞ or γ/λ ≈ 0, respec-
tively). For small transaction costs λ→ 0, a singular perturbation expansion
identifies the leading-order correction term relative to the frictionless equi-
librium in which assets are priced by taking conditional expectations under a
representative agent’s probability measure that averages the agents’ beliefs.
The correction term turns out to be proportional to the square root
√
λ
of the transaction costs. The corresponding constant of proportionality is
related to the average of the subjective drifts of the agents’ frictionless port-
folios. Thus, equilibrium prices increase relative to their frictionless counter-
parts if agents on average expect to increase their positions in the future, and
vice versa. The interpretation is that in illiquid markets, agents take into
account their future trading needs to reduce transaction costs. Accordingly,
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expectations of future purchases already lead to increased positions earlier
on and equilibrium prices increase according to the excess demand created
by the aggregated adjustments of all agents, and vice versa.
The equilibrium for small holding costs γ → 0 can be approximated by
a regular perturbation expansion around the risk-neutral equilibrium price
which averages all agents’ subjective conditional expectations. Here, the
leading-order correction term is determined by γ times the average of the
agents’ expectations of their future positions. Other things equal, agents
reduce the magnitude of their positions when holding costs are introduced,
thereby reducing the demand of agents who expect to be long on average
and increasing the demand of agents who expect to be short. The resulting
sign of the price correction therefore depends on the aggregate expectations
in the market.
To illustrate the implications of these results and test the accuracy of
the expansions, we consider an example where the state process determin-
ing the asset’s payoff has Ornstein–Uhlenbeck dynamics, a simple model
for a forward contract on a mean-reverting underlying such as an FX rate.
Agents agree on the mean-reversion level and volatility, but disagree about
the speed of mean-reversion. For these linear state dynamics, the parabolic
PDE system describing the equilibrium price can be reduced to a system of
linear ODEs by a suitable ansatz, and in turn compared to the explicit for-
mulas that obtain for our small-cost asymptotics in this case. We find that
the introduction of small transaction costs increases volatility, in line with
the asymmetric information model of [17], the risk-sharing model studied
in [26], numerical results of [1, 12] and empirical studies such as [24, 27, 41].
By contrast, the introduction of small holding costs decreases the equilibrium
volatility. The reason is the opposite manner in which the two costs influ-
ence how agents take into account future trading opportunities. Without
transaction costs, agents who believe in faster than average mean-reversion
perceive a mean-reverting price process and therefore sell when its value is
high, whereas agents who believe in slower mean-reversion perceive a price
process that exhibits “momentum” and therefore buy in this case. While
this frictionless tradeoff only depends on the current dynamics of the as-
set, transaction costs force the agents to take into account future trading
opportunities as well. That makes the current trading opportunities less at-
tractive for the agent believing in faster mean-reversion and therefore creates
an excess demand for the asset when its price is high. This in turn further
increases high prices and conversely decreases low ones, leading to additional
volatility.
Holding costs have the opposite effect, by discounting the importance of
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future trading opportunities and therefore reducing volatility relative to the
risk-neutral limiting price. In fact, the exact equilibrium volatility smoothly
interpolates between the risk-neutral volatility (which is highest) and its
counterpart without transaction costs (which is lowest). For model param-
eters estimated from time series data for the USD/EUR exchange rate, we
find that the exact equilibrium prices agree with these comparative statics
gleaned from their asymptotic approximations.
For models where trading is frictionless, there is an extensive literature
on asset pricing under heterogeneous beliefs; see, e.g., [10, 19, 38, 16] and
the references therein. To obtain tractable results with limited liquidity, we
focus on a model with quadratic holding and trading costs as well as linear
preferences over gains and losses.
Similar linear-quadratic liquidity models are used in partial equilibrium
contexts by [2, 5, 6, 30]. Risk-sharing equilibria with homogeneous beliefs
are studied in [11, 23, 26, 36]. As the corresponding first-order conditions
are linear, these models are considerably more tractable than equilibrium
models with other preferences or trading costs, where analytical results are
only available if prices or trading strategies are deterministic [32, 42, 43, 44]
or agents only trade once [37, 18]. Numerical analyses of equilibrium models
with heterogeneous beliefs and transaction costs are carried out in [1, 12].
Considering a holding cost on risky positions as in [13, 15, 35, 36] further
simplifies the analysis compared to models where the corresponding risk
penalty is imposed on the variance of the risky positions as in [22, 23, 26].
Indeed, in the present model, we can characterize the equilibrium price by
a system of linear PDEs, avoiding the nonlinear equations that naturally
appear in models where agents have risk aversion in the form of concave
utility functions. As the present work focuses on equilibrium asset prices
with heterogeneous beliefs about the underlying state process, we abstract
from heterogeneous holding costs. These are considered in [26] for agents
with homogeneous beliefs and in [7, 14] for partial equilibrium models with
heterogeneous beliefs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the financial market
and the definition of an equilibrium. In Section 3 we derive the optimal port-
folio of any agent given an exogenous asset price process. Section 4 provides
the existence, uniqueness and PDE characterization of the equilibrium price.
The leading-order asymptotics for small transaction and holding costs are
presented in Sections 5 and 6, respectively. The concluding Section 7 covers
the example with mean-reverting state process.
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Notation. As usual, C = C(Rn) is the space of continuous functions g(x)
on Rn and Ck is the space of functions g ∈ C whose partial derivatives up
to order k exist and belong to C. Similarly, C1,k is the space of continuous
functions g(t, x) such that g(t, ·), ∂tg(t, ·) ∈ Ck. For any of these spaces, a
subscript “b” indicates that the functions and all mentioned derivatives are
bounded. The dimension n of the underlying domain is often understood
from the context. Conditional expectations are denoted Et[·] = E[·|Ft] for
brevity and when F is a functional of the paths of a process Y , we will often
write Et,y[F (Y )] = E[F (Y )|Yt = y]. In this context, Y will be the solution
of an SDE and E[F (Y )|Yt = y] can be unambiguously defined as E[F (Y t,y)]
where (Y t,ys )s≥t is the unique solution of the corresponding SDE with initial
condition y at time t.
2 Model
Beliefs. Let X be the coordinate-mapping process on the space Ω =
C0([0, T ],Rd) of continuous, d-dimensional paths ω with ω0 = 0, equipped
with the canonical σ-field F and filtration (Ft)t∈[0,T ] generated by X. We
consider N (types of) agents with heterogeneous views on the distribution of
the state process X. Specifically, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ N , let Qi be a probability
measure on Ω under which X satisfies
dXt = bi(t,Xt)dt+ σi(t,Xt)dW
i
t (2.1)
where W i is a d′-dimensional Brownian motion. We assume that bi : [0, T ]×
Rd → Rd and σi : [0, T ]×Rd → Rd×d′ are jointly Lipschitz and bounded. This
guarantees in particular that (2.1) has a unique strong solution. Moreover,
we assume that the matrix σ2i := σiσ
>
i is uniformly parabolic: there is a
constant κ > 0 such that ξ>σ2i ξ ≥ κ|ξ|2 for all ξ ∈ Rd. The associated
generator is denoted by
Li = ∂t + bi∂x + 1
2
Trσ2i ∂xx. (2.2)
Remark 2.1. The above assumptions imply that the support of Qi is the
whole space Ω; cf. [39, Theorem 3.1]. Thus, if F and G are continuous
functions on Ω, then F (X) = G(X) Qi-a.s. is equivalent to F = G. This
fact will be used throughout the paper, often implicitly. Uniform parabolicity
is convenient to simplify the exposition, but of course results similar to ours
could be obtained under different assumptions. When the support of X is
not the whole space, the statements involving price functions and PDEs need
to be restricted to a suitable domain (as, e.g., in [34]).
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Market Model. Let f ∈ C3b (Rd). We consider N agents that dynamically
trade an asset with a single payoff f(XT ) at the time horizon T > 0. Fix
a constant a0 ≥ 0, the exogenous supply at time t = 0, and the initial asset
allocation ai ∈ R to each agent, where
∑N
i=1 ai = a0. Let L
p(Qi) denote
the set of progressively measurable processes φ = (φt)0≤t≤T (of appropriate
dimension) such that Ei[
∫ T
0 φ
p
tdt] <∞. An (admissible) portfolio for agent i
is a scalar process φ ∈ L 4(Qi) which satisfies φ0 = ai and is absolutely
continuous with rate φ˙ ∈ L 4(Qi).1 We say that portfolios φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N
clear the market if
N∑
i=1
φit = a0, t ∈ [0, T ]
holds pointwise. A price process (for f) is a progressively measurable pro-
cess S = (St)0≤t≤T which satisfies ST = f(XT ) and is an Itô process with
sufficiently integrable coefficients under each Qi:
dSt = µ
i
tdt+ ν
i
tdW
i
t with µ
i, νi ∈ L 4(Qi) (2.3)
for some Qi-Brownian motion W i, for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N .
Equilibrium. To formulate the agents’ optimization criteria, we fix a hold-
ing cost parameter γ > 0 and a transaction cost parameter λ > 0. (The
boundary cases λ = 0 and γ = 0 will be considered in Sections 5 and 6,
respectively.) For a given price process S, agent i maximizes her expected
returns, penalized for inventories and trading costs,
J i(φ) = Ei
[∫ T
0
(
φtdSt − γ
2
φ2tdt−
λ
2
φ˙2tdt
)]
(2.4)
over the set of her admissible portfolios. A portfolio φi is optimal for agent i
if it is a maximizer. If S is a price process such that there exist optimal
portfolios φi, 1 ≤ i ≤ N for the agents which clear the market, then S is
an equilibrium price process. Finally, v : [0, T ] × Rd → R is an equilibrium
price function if v(t,Xt) defines an equilibrium price process. We shall be
interested in symmetric equilibria with prices of this Markovian form; how-
ever, the associated portfolios are usually path-dependent in the presence of
transaction costs. As is implicit in (2.4), the interest rate is assumed to be
zero throughout.
1The precise integrability condition is not crucial; we simply need to ensure that the
local martingale part of
∫
φdS has vanishing expectation when S is defined as in (2.3). In
our main equilibrium result the optimal portfolios are bounded.
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3 Single-Agent Optimality
As a preparation for the equilibrium result, we first fix agent i and solve her
individual optimization problem in the face of an exogenous price process.
Similar linear-quadratic optimization problems have been considered, e.g.,
in [5, 6, 11, 13, 22, 23, 30]; we provide a self-contained derivation for the
convenience of the reader.
Lemma 3.1. Let γ > 0, λ > 0 and
G(t) = cosh
(√
γ
λ
(T − t)
)
, t ∈ [0, T ]. (3.1)
Given a price process S as in (2.3), the dt×Qi-a.e. unique optimal portfolio
for agent i is
φit =
G(t)
G(0)
ai +
∫ t
0
G(t)
G(s)
Eis
[∫ T
s
G(u)
G(s)
µiu
λ
du
]
ds. (3.2)
In particular, the optimal trading rate is characterized by the random ODE
φ˙it =
G′(t)
G(t)
φit + E
i
t
[∫ T
t
G(s)
G(t)
µis
λ
ds
]
, φi0 = ai. (3.3)
As in the previous literature, the optimal trading strategy tracks the aver-
age Eit [
∫ T
t − γG(s)λG′(t) µ
i
s
γ ds] of the discounted future values of the no-transaction
cost portfolio µit/γ obtained by pointwise maximization of the drift of (2.4).
To wit, illiquidity is accounted for by “aiming in front of the moving tar-
get” [22]. Both the tracking speed −G′(t)/G(t) and the discount kernel
K(t, s) = −γG(s)/λG′(t) are determined by the ratio γ/λ of holding and
transaction costs, with relatively lower transaction costs leading to faster
trading and more emphasis on the current returns of the asset.
Proof of Lemma 3.1. Direct differentiation shows that φ˙i of (3.3) is indeed
the derivative of φi in (3.2). Moreover, µi ∈ L 4(Qi) and Doob’s inequality
imply that φi ∈ L 4(Qi) and then (3.3) yields that φ˙i ∈ L 4(Qi).
Note that
J i(φ) = Ei
[∫ T
0
(
φtµ
i
t −
γ
2
φ2t −
λ
2
φ˙2t
)
dt
]
for any portfolio φ and that portfolios can be parametrized by their trad-
ing rates as the initial allocations are fixed and φ˙ ∈ L 4(Qi) implies φ ∈
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L 4(Qi). The strict concavity of J i implies that any optimizer is (a.e.) unique
and that a trading rate φ˙ is optimal if and only if the Gâteaux derivative
limε→0 1ε [J
i(φ˙+ εϑ˙)− J i(φ˙)] of (2.4) vanishes in all directions ϑ˙ ∈ L 4(Qi);
that is,
0 = Ei
[∫ T
0
(
µit
∫ t
0
ϑ˙sds− γφit
∫ t
0
ϑ˙sds− λφ˙itϑ˙t
)
dt
]
= Ei
[∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
(
µis − γφis
)
ds− λφ˙it
)
ϑ˙tdt
]
, ϑ˙ ∈ L 4(Qi).
As ϑ˙ is arbitrary, this is equivalent to φ˙it =
1
λE
i
t [
∫ T
t (µ
i
s − γφis)ds], which is
in turn equivalent to
φ˙it = M
i
t −
1
λ
∫ t
0
(µis − γφis)ds
for some Qi-martingale M i. Put differently, φ˙ ∈ L4(Qi) is optimal if and
only if it solves the linear forward-backward SDE
dφt = φ˙tdt, φ0 = ai, (3.4)
dφ˙t =
γ
λ
(
φt − µ
i
t
γ
)
dt+ dMt, φ˙T = 0. (3.5)
Direct computation shows that (φi, φ˙i) solves this system: (3.4) is trivial and
for (3.5) we note that
dφ˙it =
{(
G′′(t)
G(t)
− G
′(t)2
G(t)2
)
φit +
G′(t)
G(t)
(
G′(t)
G(t)
φit + E
i
t
[∫ T
t
G(s)
G(t)
µis
λ
ds
])
− G
′(t)
G(t)2
Eit
[∫ T
t
G(s)
µis
λ
ds
]
− µ
i
t
λ
}
dt
+
1
G(t)
dEit
[∫ T
0
G(s)µis
λ
ds
]
=
γ
λ
(
φit −
µit
γ
)
dt+ dMt
for the Qi-martingale M =
∫ ·
0
1
G(t)dE
i
t [
∫ T
0
G(s)µis
λ ds], where G
′′(t) = γλG(t)
was used. As G′(T ) = 0, the terminal condition φ˙iT = 0 is also satisfied.
4 Equilibrium
The following result establishes the existence and uniqueness of an equilib-
rium price function v ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ]× Rd) and its characterization through a
weakly coupled system of linear parabolic equations. Recall that the function
G was defined in (3.1) as G(t) = cosh(
√
(γ/λ)(T − t)).
8
Theorem 4.1. Let γ > 0, λ > 0. The parabolic system
∂tvi +
1
2
Trσ2i ∂xxvi + bi∂xvi +
G′(t)
G(t)
(vi − v) = 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, (4.1)
v :=
1
N
N∑
i=1
vi +
λG′(t)
NG(t)
a0, (4.2)
vi(T, ·) = f, 1 ≤ i ≤ N (4.3)
has a unique solution v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2b ([0, T ] × Rd), and the function v
defined via (4.2) is an equilibrium price function. It is unique in the sense
that any equilibrium price function w ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rd) with polynomial
growth must be equal to v. The equilibrium portfolios are given by
φit =
G(t)
G(0)
ai +
∫ t
0
G(t)
G(s)
Eis
[∫ T
s
G(u)
G(s)
Liv(u,Xu)
λ
du
]
ds.
An immediate consequence of this result is that the holding costs γ and
transaction costs λ have dual roles. In particular, in the case of zero net
supply a0 = 0, the equilibrium price depends only on the ratio γ/λ, so
that small transaction costs are equivalent to large holding costs. When
a0 > 0, the theorem shows that the equilibrium price is 0-homogeneous in
(γ, λ, 1/a0). We discuss this in more detail in Section 6 below, after deriving
the limiting cases for small costs.
As a preparation for the proof of Theorem 4.1, we first establish the
analytic properties of the parabolic system. Given α ∈ (0, 1), the Hölder
space C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ] × Rd) consists of the functions w(t, x) such that
w, ∂tw, ∂xw, ∂xxw exist, are bounded, and uniformly Hölder continuous with
exponents α/2 in t and α in x.
Proposition 4.2. The system (4.1–4.3) has a unique solution v1, . . . , vN ∈
C1,2b ([0, T ] × Rd). In fact, v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ] × Rd) for all α ∈
(0, 1) and uniqueness holds in the larger class of functions w1, . . . , wN ∈
C1,2([0, T ) × Rd) ∩ C([0, T ] × Rd) satisfying |wi(t, x)| ≤ c1 exp(c2|x|2) for
some constants c1, c2 ≥ 0.
Proof. The system (4.1–4.3) is a weakly coupled, uniformly parabolic linear
system; see [21, Chapter 9] for background. Uniqueness in the stated class is
a special case of [9, Theorem 1]. An existence result for such linear systems
is contained, e.g., in [21, Theorem 3, p. 256], but this does not yield growth
estimates of the type we require here. Our system is also covered by a
literature on reaction–diffusion systems. Specifically, [8, Theorem 2.4] yields
9
that (4.1–4.3) has a unique solution v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2([0, T )×Rd)∩Cb([0, T ]×
Rd). The main point (which we have not found provided in the literature)
is to prove a useful growth estimate on the derivatives, and for that, the key
element is to provide a Hölder estimate for vi.
(i) In this step we show that vi is globally Lipschitz in x, uniformly in t.
Writing u = (u1, . . . , uN ), our system is of the general form
Liui(t, x) + h(t, u(t, x)) = 0, ui(T, x) = fi(x), 1 ≤ i ≤ N (4.4)
satisfying the following conditions, for some constant c > 0: the function h
is jointly Lipschitz with norm Lip(h) ≤ c (hence h(t, ·) is of linear growth,
uniformly in t); the coefficients of Li are bounded and Lipschitz; each fi is
bounded and Lipschitz with norm Lip(fi). According to [8, Theorem 2.4],
such a system has a (unique) solution v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2 ∩Cb. Indeed, define
Fi(u)(t, x) := E
i
[
fi(X
t,x
T ) +
∫ T
t
h(s, u(s,Xt,xs ))ds
]
, 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
It is shown in the proofs of [8, Theorems 2.3 and 2.4] that F = (F1, . . . , FN )
is a contraction on (Cb)N = Cb × · · · × Cb for a complete norm which is
equivalent to the uniform norm. More precisely, this holds after suitably
truncating h (i.e., so that the truncation does not affect the bounded so-
lution). It is shown that if we start at any u ∈ (Cb)N and iterate F ,
the sequence un = (F ◦ · · · ◦ F )(u) will converge uniformly to a solution
(v1, . . . , vN ) ∈ (C1,2 ∩ Cb)N of (4.4). We may, in particular, pick u ∈ (Cb)N
such that sup0≤s≤T Lip(ui(s, ·)) <∞ for all 1 ≤ i ≤ N as our starting point
for the iteration.
By a standard estimate on SDEs (e.g., [40, Theorem 2.4 (i), p. 8]),
Ei|Xt,xs −Xt,ys | ≤ K|x− y|, 0 ≤ s ≤ T
for a constantK depending only on the Lipschitz constants of the coefficients
of Li and T . Fix a small time interval [t, T ] of length τ = T − t > 0 and let
Lu = L
(t)
u = max
1≤i≤N
sup
t≤r≤T
Lip(ui(r, ·)).
Then for t ≤ s ≤ T we have that
|Fi(u)(s, x)− Fi(u)(s, y)|
≤ Ei
[
Lip(fi)|Xs,xT −Xs,yT |+
∫ T
s
cmaxi Lip(ui(r, ·))|Xs,xr −Xs,yr |dr
]
≤ [K Lip(fi) + τcKLu] |x− y|.
10
This holds for all i. Choose τ such that ε := τcK < 1 and set Lf =
max1≤i≤N K Lip(fi), then
Lip(F (u)(s, ·)) ≤ Lf + εLu, t ≤ s ≤ T,
the notation of course meaning that each component Fi(u) satisfies this
property. Iterating yields that un = (F ◦ · · · ◦ F )(u) satisfies the geometric
estimate
Lip(un(s, ·)) ≤ Lf
n−1∑
k=0
εk + εnLu
and hence the uniform limit (v1, . . . , vN ) = limun satisfies Lip(vi(s, ·)) ≤
Lf (1− ε)−1 for t ≤ s ≤ T .
Note that the size τ of the interval in the above argument does not depend
on Lip(f). Hence we can repeat the argument on the interval [T −2τ, T −τ ],
replacing the terminal condition fi by f˜i := vi(T − τ, ·). Continuing finitely
many times, we conclude that sup0≤s≤T Lip(vi(s, ·)) <∞.
(ii) Next, we show that vi is globally 1/2-Hölder in t, uniformly in x. A
simple SDE estimate shows that
Ei|Xt′,xs −Xt,xs | ≤ K|t′ − t|1/2, 0 ≤ t ≤ t′ ≤ s ≤ T
where K now depends on the Lipschitz constants and uniform bounds for
bi and σi as well as T . (To see this one may, e.g., go through the proof
of [40, Theorem 2.4 (ii), p. 8] and use the uniform bounds in the estimate
below Equation (2.5) of that reference to avoid a dependence on x in the
final estimate for Ei|Xt,xs −Xt,ys |.)
As mentioned above, the relevant function h in (4.4) is truncated in u,
so that ‖h‖∞ <∞. This yields the (crude but simple) estimate∫ t′
t
|h(s,Xt,xs , u(s,Xt,xs ))|ds ≤ ‖h‖∞|t′ − t| ≤ c′|t′ − t|1/2 (4.5)
for some constant c′, because |t′ − t| ≤ T . If u ∈ (Cb)N is Lipschitz in x
with constant Lu uniformly in t, we then have, similarly as in (i) but using
also (4.5),
|Fi(u)(t′, x)− Fi(u)(t, x)|
≤ Ei
[
Lip(fi)|Xt
′,x
T −Xt,xT |+ c′|t′ − t|1/2 +
∫ T
t′
cLu|Xt′,xs −Xt,xs |ds
]
≤ [K Lip(fi) + c′ + TcLuK] |t′ − t|1/2.
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Again, we iterate the mapping F to generate un = (F ◦· · ·◦F )(u). By (i) we
have that supn Lun <∞. Hence, the above shows that |uni (t′, x)−uni (t, x)| ≤
c′′|t′ − t|1/2 for a uniform constant c′′, and then the same holds for the limit
(v1, . . . , vN ) = limu
n.
(iii) We have shown above that v is globally Lipschitz in x and 1/2-Hölder
in t; in particular vj ∈ Cα/2,α for all α ∈ (0, 1). (See [31, p. 117] for a detailed
definition of the Hölder spaces.) For fixed i, we can see vi as the solution of
a scalar PDE which contains (vj)j as coefficients: ϕ = vi is the solution of
L˜ϕ(t, x) + g(t, x) = 0, ϕ(T, ·) = f
on [0, T ]×Rd with terminal value f ∈ C2+α, parabolic operator L˜u := Liu−u
and inhomogeneous term g ∈ Cα/2,α defined by
g = vi +
G′(t)
G(t)
(
vi − 1
N
N∑
i=1
vi +
λG′(t)
NG(t)
a0
)
using the fixed functions (vj)1≤j≤N . We can now apply a suitable version of
the Schauder estimates to conclude that vi = ϕ ∈ C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ] × Rd);
cf. [31, Theorem 9.2.3, p. 140].
Remark 4.3. Suppose that bi, σi, f ∈ C∞b for 1 ≤ i ≤ N . Then we also
have vi ∈ C∞b .
Proof. If bi, σi ∈ C∞([0, T )×Rd), interior regularity for parabolic systems as
stated in [21, Theorem 11, p. 265] immediately yields that the solution from
Proposition 4.2 is in C∞([0, T ) × Rd). We need to show that the partial
derivatives of any order are bounded.
Fix 1 ≤ i ≤ N and 1 ≤ k ≤ d and consider the function ϕ = ∂xkvi. We
can differentiate the system (4.1) with respect to xk and rearrange the terms
to find that ϕ is the solution of a scalar parabolic equation
Lϕ(t, x) + g(t, x) = 0, ϕ(T, ·) = ∂xkf
on [0, T ] × Rd with terminal value ∂xkf ∈ C∞b ⊆ C2+α. Here the inho-
mogeneity g incorporates all other terms resulting from the differentiated
equation: it is a linear combination, with coefficients in C∞([0, T )×Rd), of
the functions vj , 1 ≤ j ≤ N as well as their first and second-order spatial
derivatives. As vj ∈ C1+α/2,2+α by Proposition 4.2, we see in particular that
g ∈ Cα/2,α. Thus, we can conclude from [31, Theorem 9.2.3, p. 140] that
∂xkvi = ϕ ∈ C1+α/2,2+α([0, T ] × Rd). In particular, the third-order spatial
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derivatives of vi are bounded and uniformly Hölder continuous. Moreover, by
the parabolic form of the above equation, the same follows for ∂t∂xkvi = ∂tϕ.
This argument can be iterated to the higher-order derivatives.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. The formula for the equilibrium portfolios is a direct
consequence of Proposition 5.1, so we focus on the price.
(i) Let v1, . . . , vN ∈ C1,2b be the solution from Proposition 4.2 and define v
by (4.2); we show that v is an equilibrium price function. Itô’s formula shows
that St = v(t,Xt) is a price process as defined in (2.3); the coefficients µi and
νi are even bounded. In view of (4.2), the function wi(t, x) := G(t)vi(t, x)
satisfies
Liwi = GLivi +G′vi = G′v
and wi(T, x) = G(T )vi(T, x) = f(x). Thus, Itô’s formula and the bounded-
ness of ∂xvi imply that under Qi we have the Feynman–Kac representation
wi(t, x) = E
i
t,x[f(XT )]−
∫ T
t
G′(u)Eit,x[v(u,Xu)]du.
As a result,
vi(t, x) =
Eit,x[f(XT )]
G(t)
−
∫ T
t
G′(u)
G(t)
Eit,x[v(u,Xu)]du (4.6)
for all (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]×Rd. Lemma 3.1 shows that given the price St = v(t,Xt),
the portfolio
φit =
∫ t
0
G(t)
G(s)
Eis,Xs
[ ∫ T
s
G(u)
G(s)
1
λ
Liv(u,Xu) du
]
ds+
G(t)ai
G(0)
(4.7)
is optimal for agent i. It remains to prove that these portfolios clear the mar-
ket. Recalling thatG(T ) = 1, taking expectations in the integration-by-parts
formula
∫ T
s G(u)dSu = G(T )ST −G(s)Ss−
∫ T
s G
′(u)Sudu and applying (4.6)
yield
Eis,x
[∫ T
s
G(u)
G(s)
1
λ
Liv(u,Xu) du
]
=
1
λG(s)
(
Eis,x[f(XT )]−G(s)v(s, x)−
∫ T
s
G′(u)Eis,x[v(u,Xu)]du
)
=
1
λ
[vi(s, x)− v(s, x)]. (4.8)
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In view of (4.2), we deduce that
N∑
i=1
Eis,x
[∫ T
s
G(u)
G(s)
1
λ
Liv(u,Xu) du
]
= −G
′(s)
G(s)
a0.
Using this in (4.7) and integrating −G′(s)
G2(s)
= ∂sG(s)
−1, we conclude that
N∑
i=1
φit = −a0
∫ t
0
G(t)
G(s)
G′(s)
G(s)
ds+
G(t)a0
G(0)
= a0
as desired.
(ii) Let St = w(t,Xt) be an equilibrium price process for some func-
tion w ∈ C1,2([0, T ] × Rd) of polynomial growth (or, more generally, w ∈
C1,2([0, T ) × Rd) of polynomial growth and locally Hölder continuous on
[0, T ] × Rd). We have w(T, ·) = f by Remark 2.1. Recall that the coef-
ficients µit = Liw(t,Xt) and νit = ∂xw(t,Xt)>σit of (2.3) are in L4(Qi) as
part of our definition of a price process. We define wi by the Feynman–Kac
formula (4.6) with w instead of v. In view of the assumptions on bi and
σi, the function wi has polynomial growth like w. Moreover, by a careful
application of standard PDE results, wi ∈ C1,2 and wi is a solution of the
associated linear PDE (4.1). Specifically, we can use an approximation with
bounded domains as detailed in [25, Theorem 1, Condition (A3’), Lemma 2
and the comments above it] under the stated conditions on w.
It remains to show (4.2). As a consequence of Lemma 3.1, the agents’
equilibrium portfolios φi are given by (4.7). Because these portfolios clear
the market,
∑
i φ
i
s = a0 and thus ∂s
∑
i
φis
G(s) = a0∂sG(s)
−1. Reversing the
integration by parts (4.8), we conclude that
N∑
i=1
1
G(s)λ
[wi(s, x)− w(s, x)] =
N∑
i=1
1
G(s)
Eis,x
[∫ T
s
G(u)
G(s)
1
λ
Liw(u,Xu) du
]
= ∂s
N∑
i=1
φis
G(s)
= a0∂sG(s)
−1 = −a0 G
′(s)
G(s)2
which is equivalent to (4.2). We have thus established that w1, . . . , wN ∈ C1,2
are a solution of (4.1) with polynomial growth. The claim now follows by
the uniqueness of the solution as stated in Proposition 4.2.
Remark 4.4. The restriction to Markovian equilibria in Theorem 4.1 (mean-
ing that the price is a function of t and x) is related to our choice of
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proof through PDE arguments rather than fundamental. For instance, if
the volatility σi is the same for all agents, similar arguments could be car-
ried out using backward SDEs (e.g., [29]). In that framework, one would
obtain uniqueness within a class of possibly non-Markovian equilibria and
one could also cover beliefs where (2.1) is replaced by coefficients that may
depend on the path of X.
5 Asymptotics for Small Transaction Costs
In this section we provide intuition for the equilibrium price from Theo-
rem 4.1 by describing its asymptotics for small transaction costs λ→ 0. For
later comparison, we first consider the model without transaction costs; i.e.,
λ = 0. In this case we drop the requirement of absolute continuity in the
definition of the admissible portfolios and we also do not enforce the initial
holdings ai (in any event, agents can instantaneously adjust their position
after t = 0 without incurring costs). The following result, which is a special
case of [35, Theorem 2.1 and Remark 3.5], shows that the corresponding
equilibrium corresponds to the price of a representative agent with a view Q¯
defined by the averaged drift and volatility coefficients.
Proposition 5.1. Let λ = 0 and γ > 0. There exists a unique equilibrium
price function v0 ∈ C1,2b , given by
v0(t, x) = E¯t,x[f(XT )]− (T − t)γa0
N
where E¯[·] is the expectation for the probability Q¯ under which
dXt = b¯(t,Xt)dt+ σ¯(t,Xt)dWt, b¯ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 bi, σ¯
2 = 1N
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i
for a Brownian motion W . Equivalently, v0 is the unique bounded classical
solution of
∂tv +
1
2
Tr σ¯2∂xxv + b¯∂xv − γa0
N
= 0, v(T, ·) = f. (5.1)
In equilibrium, the dt×Qi-a.e. unique optimal portfolio for agent i is
φi,0t =
Liv0(t,Xt)
γ
. (5.2)
In the remainder of this section we denote the equilibrium price from
Theorem 4.1 by vλ to emphasize the dependence on λ. Our goal is to compute
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its leading-order deviation λ−1/2(vλ − v0) from the frictionless equilibrium
price v0 of Proposition 5.1. For simplicity, we focus on the case of a one-
dimensional state variable (d = 1) with smooth drift and diffusion coefficients
and terminal condition: bi, σi, f ∈ C∞b for 1 ≤ i ≤ N , and hence v, vi ∈ C∞b
on the strength of Remark 4.3.
Theorem 5.2. For fixed holding costs γ > 0 and small transaction costs
λ→ 0, the equilibrium price function vλ from Theorem 4.1 has the expansion
vλ(t, x) = v0(t, x) +
√
λv∗(t, x) + o(
√
λ) locally uniformly on [0, T ]× R.
(5.3)
Here, v0 is the frictionless equilibrium price from Proposition 5.1 and
v∗(t, x) =
√
γ
N
N∑
i=1
E¯t,x
[∫ T
t
Liφˆi,0(s,Xs)ds
]
(5.4)
where φˆi,0(s, x) = Liv0(s, x)/γ is the feedback function determining agent i’s
frictionless optimal portfolio (5.2) and the expectation is taken under the
probability measure Q¯ of the frictionless representative agent for which
dXt = b¯(t,Xt)dt+ σ¯(t,Xt)dWt, b¯ =
1
N
∑N
i=1 bi, σ¯
2 = 1N
∑N
i=1 σ
2
i .
The singular perturbation expansion (5.3) shows that the leading-order
deviation of the frictional equilibrium price vλ from its frictionless counter-
part v0 scales with the square root
√
λ of the trading cost, as in the risk-
sharing equilibrium of [26]. With the heterogeneous beliefs considered in the
present study, the constant of proportionality (5.4) is determined by the in-
tegrated drift rates
∫ T
t Liφˆi,0(s,Xs)ds of the agents’ frictionless equilibrium
portfolios, averaged with respect to agents and states. Thus, equilibrium
prices increase relative to their frictionless counterparts if agents on average
expect to increase their positions in the future, and vice versa.2 The in-
terpretation is that in illiquid markets, agents take into account their future
trading needs to save cumulative transaction costs over the whole time inter-
val. Accordingly, expectations of future purchases already lead to increased
positions earlier on, and vice versa. To clear the market, equilibrium prices
increase or decrease according to the excess demand or supply created by
the aggregated adjustments of all agents.
2 Note that while the actual future portfolio changes add up to zero by market clearing,
this is not necessarily true for the changes as anticipated by the heterogeneous agents under
their subjective probability measures, Liφˆi,0. In the formula for v∗, these anticipated
changes are averaged across all states under the probability measure Q¯ corresponding to
the frictionless representative agent.
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5.1 Proof of Theorem 5.2
The first step towards the proof of Theorem 5.2 is to show that the functions
vλi from Theorem 4.1 are not just bounded for each λ, but that this bound is
in fact uniform for λ ∈ (0,∞). In view of the PDEs (4.1) from Theorem 4.1
and as λG
′(t)2
NG(t)2
a0 is uniformly bounded for all λ > 0 and t ∈ [0, T ] by the
definition of G, this is a special case of the following more general result that
will also allow us to derive estimates for small holding costs in the subsequent
section.
Lemma 5.3. For i = 1, . . . , N and an arbitrary parameter ε ∈ E , consider
functions αi, βi, aεi , b
ε
i , hi ∈ C∞b ([0, T ]× R) and write
Li = ∂t + 1
2
β2i ∂xx + αi∂x.
Suppose that aεi , b
ε
i are bounded uniformly in ε ∈ E and let ui = ui(ε, λ, γ),
i = 1, . . . , N denote the unique classical bounded solution of the system
Liui +
(G′
G
+ aεi
)
ui − G
′
G
1
N
N∑
j=1
uj + b
ε
i = 0, ui(T, ·) = hi, i = 1, . . . , N.
Then, |ui(t, x)| ≤ M for a constant M > 0 independent of ε, λ, γ ∈ (0,∞)
and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Proof. Existence and uniqueness of the ui is a special case of [8, Theorem 2.4].
Because these functions are bounded, the Feynman–Kac formula as in [28,
Theorem 5.7.6] as well as G′/G = (logG)′ and G(T ) = 1 give
e
∫ t
0 a
ε
i dτui(t, x) = E
i
t,x
[∫ T
t
−G
′(s)
G(t)
1
N
N∑
j=1
e
∫ s
0 a
ε
i dτuj(s,Xs)ds
+
∫ T
t
e
∫ s
0 a
ε
i dτ
G(s)
G(t)
bεids+ e
∫ T
0 a
ε
i dτ
1
G(t)
hi(XT )
]
where the expectation is taken under the measure for which the state variable
has dynamics dXt = αi(t,Xt)dt+βi(t,Xt)dW it . Choose a uniform boundM
for
∣∣e∫ s0 aεi dτ bεi ∣∣ and ∣∣e∫ T0 aεi dτhi∣∣, and define
K(t, λ, γ) = max
{
|e
∫ t
0 a
ε
i (τ,xτ )dτui(t, xt)|
}
<∞,
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where the maximum is taken over i ∈ {1, . . . , N}, ε ∈ E , and (xτ )τ∈[0,t] ∈
C0([0, t],R). With this notation,
|e
∫ t
0 a
ρ
i dτui(t, x)| ≤
∫ T
t
−G
′(s)
G(t)
K(s, λ, γ)ds+M
∫ T
t
G(s)
G(t)
ds+
M
G(t)
,
which in turn leads to
G(t)K(t, λ, γ) ≤
∫ T
t
(
− G
′(s)
G(s)
)
G(s)K(s, λ, γ)ds+M
∫ T
t
G(s)ds+M.
We may read this as an inequality of the form u(t) ≤ ∫ Tt B(s)u(s)ds+A(t)
for u(t) = G(t)K(t, λ, γ). Using G′/G = (logG)′ and that G is decreasing,∫ T
t G(r)dr ≤ G(t)T and Grönwall’s lemma yield
G(t)K(t, λ, γ) ≤M(G(t)T + 1)−MG(t)
∫ T
t
(∫ T
s
G(r)dr + 1
)G′(s)
G(s)2
ds.
(5.5)
Observe that G satisfies G = λγG
′′ and G′(T ) = 0 and λγ
(G′)2
G2
≤ 1, so that
−
∫ T
t
(∫ T
s
G(r)dr
)G′(s)
G(s)2
ds =
∫ T
t
λ
γ
G′(s)2
G(s)2
ds ≤ T − t ≤ T.
Together with
−
∫ T
t
G′(s)
G(s)2
ds = 1− 1
G(t)
≤ 1,
it follows from (5.5) and G(t) ≥ 1 that K(t, λ, γ) ≤ 2M(T + 1). As aε is
uniformly bounded in ε, t, x, the function ui is therefore uniformly bounded
in ε, γ, λ, t, x by the definition of K(t, λ, γ).
Corollary 5.4. There exists M > 0 such that |vλi (t, x)| ≤ M for all λ > 0
and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Next, we establish an analogous uniform bound for the derivatives of the
functions vλi and v
λ from Theorem 5.2.
Lemma 5.5. Fix k ≥ 0. There exists M > 0 such that
|∂kxvλi (t, x)|, |∂kxvλ(t, x)|, |∂t∂kxvλ(t, x)| ≤M
for all λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
18
Proof. By Theorem 4.1 and Remark 4.3, the x-derivatives of the functions
vλi , i = 1, . . . , N from Theorem 4.1 satisfy the following PDEs obtained by
differentiating (4.1) with respect to the spatial variable:
∂t∂xv
λ
i +
1
2
σ2i ∂xx∂xv
λ
i + (bi + σi∂xσi)∂x∂xv
λ
i (5.6)
+
(
∂xbi +
G′
G
)
∂xv
λ
i −
G′
G
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂xv
λ
j = 0, ∂xv
λ
i (T, ·) = f ′.
Lemma 5.3 therefore yields the desired uniform bound for |∂xvλi (t, x)|, and in
turn also for ∂xvλ(t, x) = 1N
∑N
i=1 ∂xv
λ
i (t, x). The corresponding bounds for
the higher-order x-derivatives follow by iterating this argument. Finally, the
uniform bound for the time derivative of ∂kxvλ is then direct consequences of
the parabolic form of the PDEs (4.1), (5.6), etc., and their sums.
Lemma 5.6. For λ > 0, consider α, β, aλ, h of class C∞b and write
L = ∂t + 1
2
β2∂xx + α∂x.
Suppose that wλ ∈ C∞b satisfies wλ(T, ·) = h and ∂twλ, ∂xwλ, ∂xxwλ, aλ are
bounded uniformly in λ. Then, the unique bounded classical solution uλ of
Luλ + aλ(t, x) + G
′(t)
G(t)
(uλ − wλ) = 0, uλ(T, ·) = h
satisfies
|uλ(t, x)− wλ(t, x)|√
λ
≤M
for some M > 0 independent of λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Proof. Following the same steps as in the derivation of (4.8) yields that
uλ(t, x) = wλ(t, x) + Et,x
[∫ T
t
G(u)
G(t)
(
aλ + Lwλ
)
(u,Xu)du
]
(5.7)
where the expectation is taken under the measure for which the state variable
has dynamics dXt = α(t,Xt)dt+β(t,Xt)dWt. With a uniform bound M for
aλ + Lwλ, the desired bound is
|uλ(t, x)− wλ(t, x)|√
λ
≤ M√
λ
∫ T
t
G(u)
G(t)
du = −M
√
λ
γ
G′(t)
G(t)
≤ M√
γ
where we have once again used G(u) = λγG
′′(u) and G′(T ) = 1 in the second
step and the definition of G for the last inequality.
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Corollary 5.7. Fix k ≥ 0. There exists M > 0 such that
|∂kxvλi (t, x)− ∂kxvλ(t, x)|√
λ
≤M
for all λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R and i ∈ {1, . . . , N}.
Proof. In view of the PDEs (4.1) from Theorem 4.1 and the uniform bounds
from Lemma 5.5, Lemma 5.6 yields that λ−1/2|vλi − vλ| ≤ M for some con-
stant M . This proves the assertion for k = 0. The analogous bounds for
the derivatives follow by applying the same argument to the corresponding
PDEs obtained by differentiating (4.1) as in the proof of Lemma 5.5.
We can now estimate the difference between vλ and the frictionless equi-
librium price v0 of Proposition 5.1.
Proposition 5.8. Fix k ≥ 0. There exists M > 0 such that
|∂kxvλ(t, x)− ∂kxv0(t, x)|√
λ
,
|∂t∂kxvλ(t, x)− ∂t∂kxv0(t, x)|√
λ
≤M
for all λ > 0 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T ]× R.
Proof. Using (4.2) and then (4.1) for v, subtracting the PDE (5.1) for v0,
and using once again G(u) = λγG
′′(u), we obtain
∂t(v
λ − v0) + 1
2
σ¯2∂xx(v
λ − v0) + b¯∂x(vλ − v0) (5.8)
+
1
N
N∑
i=1
1
2
σ2i (∂xxv
λ
i − ∂xxvλ) +
1
N
N∑
i=1
bi(∂xv
λ
i − ∂xvλ) = 0
with (vλ− v0)(T, ·) = 0. Here b¯, σ¯ are as defined in Proposition 5.1. The de-
sired uniform bound for λ−1/2|vλ−v0| is now a consequence of the Feynman–
Kac formula and Corollary 5.7. The analogous result for λ−1/2|∂kxvλ− ∂kxv0|
follows from the same argument because Remark 4.3 shows that these deriva-
tives satisfy similar PDEs obtained by differentiating (5.8). The correspond-
ing bounds for the time derivatives in turn are a consequence of the parabolic
form of the equations.
We have the following version of “Laplace’s method” for our function
G(t) = cosh(
√
γ
λ(T − t)) as λ→ 0.
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Lemma 5.9. Given t ∈ [0, T ) and a continuous function F on [t, T ],√
γ
λ
∫ T
t
(−G′(u)
G(t)
(∫ u
t
F (s)ds
))
du→ F (t) as λ→ 0. (5.9)
Proof. The left-hand side of (5.9) can be decomposed as√
γ
λ
∫ T
t
−G′(u)
G(t)
∫ u
t
(
F (s)− F (t)
)
dsdu+
√
γ
λ
∫ T
t
−G′(u)
G(t)
∫ u
t
F (t)dsdu.
Using the uniform continuity of F on [t, T ] and observing that
√
γ
λ
−G′(·)
G(t)
converges to 0 locally uniformly on (t, T ], one verifies that the first term
vanishes for λ→ 0. Integration by parts and G = λγG′′ show that the second
term converges to F (t).
Together with the uniform bounds from Proposition 5.8, Lemma 5.9 al-
lows us to compute the leading-order expansions of vλi −vλ and its derivatives.
Lemma 5.10. For k = 0, 1, 2 and (t, x) ∈ [0, T )× R, we have
lim
λ→0
∂kxv
λ
i (t, x)− ∂kxvλ(t, x)√
λ
=
∂kxLiv0(t, x)√
γ
. (5.10)
Proof. The proof is similar for k = 0, 1, 2; we only spell it out in the case
k = 2 for which the computations are most involved. By Theorem 4.1 and
Remark 4.3, the second-order x-derivatives of the functions vλi , i = 1, . . . , N
from Theorem 4.1 satisfy the following PDEs obtained by differentiating (4.1)
twice with respect to the spatial variable:
∂t∂xxv
λ
i +
1
2
σ2i ∂xx∂xxv
λ
i + (bi + 2σi∂xσi)∂x∂xxv
λ
i
+
(
ci +
G′
G
)
∂xxv
λ
i + ∂xxbi∂xv
λ
i −
G′
G
1
N
N∑
j=1
∂xxv
λ
j = 0, ∂xxv
λ
i (T, ·) = f ′′,
where ci = 2∂xbi + (∂xσi)2 + σi∂xxσi. As all functions appearing here are
bounded either by assumption or by Remark 4.3, the Feynman–Kac formula
and G′/G = (logG)′ yield the stochastic representation
∂xxv
λ
i (t, x)
= E′t,x
[∫ T
t
−G′(u)
G(t)
(
e
∫ u
t cidτ∂xxv
λ(u,Xu)
)
du+
e
∫ T
t cidτf ′′(XT )
G(t)
+
∫ T
t
G(u)
G(t)
(
e
∫ u
t cidτ∂xxbi∂xv
λ
i (u,Xu)
)
du
]
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where the expectation E′[·] is taken under the measure Q′ for which the
state variable has dynamics dXt = (bi + 2σi∂xσi)(t,Xt)dt + σi(t,Xt)dW it .
Together with
∫ T
t −G
′(u)
G(t) du = 1− 1G(t) , this implies
∂xxv
λ
i − ∂xxvλ√
λ
= E′t,x
[∫ T
t
−G′(u)√
λG(t)
(
e
∫ u
t cidτ∂xxv
λ(u,Xu)− ∂xxvλ(t,Xt)
)
du
+
e
∫ T
t cidτf ′′(XT )− ∂xxvλ(t,Xt)√
λG(t)
(5.11)
+
∫ T
t
G(u)√
λG(t)
(
e
∫ u
t cidτ∂xxbi∂xv
λ
i (u,Xu)
)
du
]
.
Recalling that ci, f ′′ and (by Lemma 5.5) also ∂xxvλ are bounded (uniformly
in λ), dominated convergence and the definition of G show that the expec-
tation of the second term on the right-hand side of (5.11) converges to zero
as λ → 0. In view of limλ→0 G(T )√λG(t) = 0, dominated convergence and in-
tegration by parts show that the expectation of the third term converges
to
E′t,x
[
lim
λ→0
∫ T
t
−G′(u)√
λG(t)
(∫ u
t
e
∫ s
t cidτ∂xxbi∂xv
λ
i (s,Xs)ds
)
du
]
= ∂xxbi∂xv
0(t, x). (5.12)
Here we have used Corollary 5.7 and Proposition 5.8, and Lemma 5.9 for
the equality. Finally, the expectation of the first term on the right-hand side
of (5.11) can be rewritten by applying Itô’s formula to e
∫ u
t cidτ∂xxv
λ(u,Xu),
inserting the Q′-dynamics of X and taking into account that the correspond-
ing local martingale part has expectation zero because all involved func-
tions are bounded. Dominated convergence as well as Proposition 5.8 and
Lemma 5.9 then show that the corresponding limit for λ→ 0 is
E′t,x
[
lim
λ→0
∫ T
t
−G′(u)√
λG(t)
∫ u
t
e
∫ s
t cidτL′′i ∂xxvλ(s,Xs)dsdu
]
= L′′i ∂xxv0(t, x),
(5.13)
where L′′i = ∂t + 12σ2i ∂xx + (bi + 2σi∂xσi)∂x + ciId. The assertion for k = 2
now follows from (5.11–5.13) by observing that L′′i ∂xx+∂xxbi∂x = ∂xxLi.
We can now prove the expansion of the equilibrium price for small trans-
action costs.
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Proof of Theorem 5.2. We first observe that the PDE (5.8) for vλ−v0 admits
the Feynman–Kac representation
(vλ − v0)(t, x)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
E¯t,x
[∫ T
t
(1
2
σ2i (∂xxv
λ
i − ∂xxvλ) + bi(∂xvλi − ∂xvλ)
)
(s,Xs)ds
]
.
Dominated convergence and the limits computed in Lemma 5.10 then yield
lim
λ→0
vλ − v0√
λ
(t, x) =
√
1
γ
1
N
N∑
i=1
E¯t,x
[∫ T
t
(1
2
σ2i ∂xx + bi∂x
)
Liv0(s,Xs)ds
]
=
√
1
γ
1
N
N∑
i=1
E¯t,x
[∫ T
t
(
Li − ∂t
)
γφˆi,0(s,Xs)ds
]
(5.14)
where φˆi,0 = Liv0/γ is the frictionless equilibrium portfolio function of
agent i; cf. (5.2). As these strategies clear the market, the sum of their
time derivatives is zero and the pointwise limit (5.14) simplifies to (5.4).
The family {λ−1/2(vλ − v0)}λ>0 is bounded and equicontinuous by Proposi-
tion 5.8; whence, the convergence is in fact locally uniform as a consequence
of the Arzelà–Ascoli theorem.
6 Asymptotics for Small Holding Costs
Next, we study the asymptotics of the equilibrium price from Theorem 4.1 for
small holding costs γ → 0 (and fixed transaction costs λ > 0). To emphasize
the dependence on γ, we denote the price v by vγ in this section. We again
focus on the case of a one-dimensional state variable (d = 1) with smooth
drift and diffusion coefficients and terminal condition; see Remark 4.3.
To formulate the result, we first note that the risk-neutral version γ = 0
of our model is well posed and essentially covered as a simple special case of
Theorem 4.1 (with the same proof, read with the conventions G(u)/G(s) = 1
and G′(u)/G(s) = 0). The corresponding equilibrium price is the average of
all agents’ conditional expectations,
v0(t, x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
v0i (t, x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
Eit,x[f(XT )], (6.1)
and the corresponding portfolios are
φi,0t = ai +
∫ t
0
Eis
[∫ T
s
Liv0(u,Xu)
λ
du
]
ds. (6.2)
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(The above notation for the case γ = 0 should not be confused with the
notation for the case λ = 0 in the preceding section.)
Lemma 3.1 shows that when γ > 0 and λ > 0, the optimal portfolios
take into account future expected returns that are discounted with a kernel
determined by γ/λ. As a limiting case, we have seen that the no-transaction-
cost portfolio (5.2) for λ = 0 only takes into account the current (subjective)
drift rates; this corresponds to an infinite discount. In the opposite extreme,
the no-holding-cost portfolio (6.2) aggregates the future expected returns
without discounting.
Accordingly, we expect small holding costs to play a similar role as large
transaction costs. Indeed, Theorem 4.1 shows that when the supply a0 van-
ishes, the equilibrium price only depends on the ratio γ/λ—the “urgency
parameter” that determines optimal execution trajectories [3] and, more gen-
erally, optimal trading strategies with transaction costs in various contexts;
cf., e.g., [33] and the references therein. When a0 > 0, Theorem 4.1 shows
that the equilibrium price is 0-homogeneous in (γ, λ, 1/a0). This means that
the asset price remains invariant if the inverse of the supply is rescaled in the
same manner as transaction and holding costs: the larger trading and hold-
ing costs of bigger asset positions are offset by reduced friction coefficients.
The main result of this section is the following regular perturbation ex-
pansion for small holding costs γ → 0.
Theorem 6.1. For fixed transaction costs λ > 0 and small holding costs
γ → 0, the equilibrium price function from Theorem 4.1 has the expansion
vγ(t, x) = v0(t, x) + γv∗(t, x) + o(γ) uniformly on [0, T ]× R. (6.3)
Here v0 is the equilibrium price (6.1) for γ = 0 and
v∗(t, x) = − 1
N
N∑
i=1
Eit,x
[∫ T
t
φi,0s ds
]
where φi,0t is the optimal strategy (6.2) of agent i for γ = 0 and the expecta-
tion is taken under agent i’s belief Qi.
The reference point for the expansion (6.3) is the risk-neutral price v0
of (6.1). In this limiting case, agents only consider future expected returns.
Other things equal, agents reduce the magnitude of their positions when
holding costs are introduced. The above expression for v∗ reflects each
agent’s expectation Eit,x[
∫ T
t φ
i,0
s ds] of their average future position. Adding
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holding costs reduces the demand by agents who expect to be long on av-
erage, and the converse holds for shorts. The resulting sign of the price
correction will thus depend on the aggregate expectations in the market. In-
deed, the formula for v∗ shows that at the first order, the arithmetic average
over all agents’ expected average positions is the negative of the correction.
Proof of Theorem 6.1. Step 1. Similarly as for Theorem 5.2, the first step
towards proving this expansion is to establish that the functions vγi from
Theorem 4.1 are uniformly bounded in γ. Indeed, note that the function
λG′(t)2
NG(t)2
a0 is bounded locally uniformly in γ. Hence, Lemma 5.3 applied with
the PDEs (4.1–4.2) from Theorem 4.1 yields that given 0 < γ¯ < ∞, there
exists M > 0 such that
|vγi (t, x)| ≤M for all γ ∈ [0, γ¯]. (6.4)
Step 2. Next, we show that as γ → 0,
|vγi (t, x)− v0i (t, x)| → 0 uniformly on [0, T ]× R. (6.5)
Indeed, (4.1–4.2) show that
∂t(v
γ
i − v0i ) +
1
2
σ2i ∂xx(v
γ
i − v0i ) + bi∂x(vγi − v0i )
+
G′(t)
G(t)
vγi − 1N
N∑
j=1
vγj −
λG′(t)
NG(t)
a0
 = 0, (vγi − v0i )(T, ·) = 0.
Thus, the Feynman–Kac formula yields
(vγi − v0i )(t, x)
= Eit,x
∫ T
t
G′(s)
G(s)
(
vγi (s,Xs)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
vγj (s,Xs)−
λG′(s)
NG(s)
a0
)
ds
 (6.6)
where the expectation is taken under agent i’s subjective probability mea-
sure Qi. Note that G′(t) → 0 and G(t) → 1 as γ → 0, uniformly on [0, T ].
In view of (6.4), we conclude (6.5).
Step 3. We can now prove the expansion from Theorem 6.1. By (6.6),
(vγi − v0i )(t, x)
γ
= Eit,x
∫ T
t
G′(s)
γG(s)
(
vγi (s,Xs)−
1
N
N∑
j=1
vγj (s,Xs)−
λG′(s)
NG(s)
a0
)
ds
 .
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Using the definition of G and Dini’s theorem,
lim
γ→0
G′(t)
G(t)
= 0 and lim
γ→0
G′(t)
γG(t)
= −T − t
λ
, uniformly on [0, T ]. (6.7)
Together with (6.4), dominated convergence, (6.5) and (6.1), this yields
lim
γ→0
vγi (t, x)− v0i (t, x)
γ
= Eit,x
[∫ T
t
T − s
λ
(
v0(s,Xs)− v0i (s,Xs)
)
ds
]
uniformly on [0, T ]×R. In view of the definition of vγ in (4.2), and (6.7), it
follows that
lim
γ→0
vγ(t, x)− v0(t, x)
γ
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Eit,x
[∫ T
t
T − s
λ
(
v0(s,Xs)− v0i (s,Xs)
)
ds
]
− (T − t)a0
N
. (6.8)
By (6.2) and the first identity of (4.8) in the special case γ = 0, we have
φi,0t − ai =
∫ t
0
Eis
[
1
λ
(
f(XT )− v0(s,Xs)
)]
ds
=
∫ t
0
1
λ
(
v0i (s,Xs)− v0(s,Xs)
)
ds.
Using this identity to integrate (6.8) by parts and taking into account the
market-clearing condition
∑N
i=1 φ
i,0 = a0, the theorem follows.
7 Example: Mean-Reversion Trading
To gain further intuition for the equilibrium of Theorem 4.1, we consider an
example that can be solved explicitly up to a system of linear ODEs. We
will also use this example to test the numerical accuracy of the expansions
for small transaction and holding costs relative to the exact solution.
Suppose that f(x) = x, so that at time T , the state X represents the
asset’s payoff. Agents believe that X has mean-reverting dynamics
dXt = κi(X¯ −Xt)dt+ σdW it . (7.1)
That is, agents agree on the volatility σ > 0 and the mean-reversion level
X¯ > 0, but disagree about the mean-reversion speed κi > 0. This can be
interpreted as a simple model for a forward contract on a mean-reverting
underlying such as an FX rate. As is natural in that context, and to simplify
the exposition, we henceforth assume that the net supply of the contract is
a0 = 0.
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7.1 Equilibrium with Costs
We first consider the exact equilibrium price v with transaction costs λ > 0
and holding costs γ > 0 from Theorem 4.1. For the linear state dynam-
ics (7.1), the parabolic system (4.1–4.3) can be reduced to a system of linear
ODEs by the ansatz
vλi (t, x) = Ai(t) +Bi(t)x, i = 1, . . . , N.
Indeed, writing 1N and IN for the N ×N -matrices of ones and the identity
matrix, respectively, the deterministic functions B = (B1, . . . , BN )> and
A = (A1, . . . , AN )
> satisfy
B′(t) =
[
diag(κ1, . . . , κn) +
G′(t)
G(t)
(
1
N
1N − IN
)]
B(t),
B(T ) = 1
and
A′(t) =
G′(t)
G(t)
(
1
N
1N − IN
)
A(t)− X¯diag(κ1, . . . , κN )B(t),
A(T ) = 0.
These ODEs have unique, smooth solutions. Moreover, the equilibrium price
then satisfies
v(t, x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
(Ai(t) +Bi(t)x) = X¯ + (x− X¯) 1
N
N∑
i=1
Bi(t), (7.2)
where we have used the ODEs for the Ai and Bi for the second equality. To
be precise, the unbounded terminal conditions and state dynamics (7.1) do
not satisfy the boundedness assumptions of Theorem 4.1. However, with the
unique solutions A and B of the above ODEs at hand, the arguments in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 show that (7.2) identifies the unique equilibrium price
in the class from smooth functions with linear growth, say.
7.2 Transaction-Cost Asymptotics
We first study the equilibrium v0 with vanishing transactions costs λ = 0
and fixed holding costs γ > 0. As the state variable has the dynamics
dXt = κ¯(X¯ −Xt)dt+ σdWt with κ¯ = 1
N
N∑
i=1
κi (7.3)
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under the aggregate measure Q¯, Proposition 5.1 yields that
v0(t, x) = E¯t,x [XT ]− (T − t)γ
N
a0 = X¯ + (x− X¯)e−κ¯(T−t). (7.4)
As a result, agent i believes that the frictionless equilibrium price has dy-
namics
dv0(t,Xt) = (κi − κ¯)e−κ¯(T−t)(X¯ −Xt)dt+ e−κ¯(T−t)σdW it
= (κi − κ¯)
(
X¯ − v0(t,Xt)
)
dt+ e−κ¯(T−t)σdW it . (7.5)
This means that agents who believe in faster than average mean-reversion
(i.e., κi > κ¯) observe a mean-reverting process. By contrast, agents who
believe in slower than average mean reversion conclude that the process
exhibits “momentum” in that prices above the mean-reversion level are fol-
lowed by further positive drifts. Whence, in equilibrium, the market is en-
dogenously populated by both “mean-reversion traders” and “trend-followers”
even though all agents believe that the underlying has a mean-reverting fun-
damental value.
Next, we study the leading-order correction vλ(t, x)− v0(t, x) for λ→ 0.
Again, Theorem 5.2 does not apply directly due to the unbounded coeffi-
cients, but it is straightforward to carry out the arguments in the proof for
the example at hand. Thus, the leading-order correction is
√
λv∗(t, x) with
v∗(t, x) =
1√
γN
N∑
i=1
E¯t,x
[∫ T
t
e−κ¯(T−s)(κ¯− κi)2(Xs − X¯)ds
]
=
1√
γ
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(κ¯− κi)2
)[∫ T
t
E¯t,x[Xs − X¯]e−κ¯(T−s)ds
]
=
1√
γ
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(κ¯− κi)2
)[∫ T
t
e−κ¯(T−t)(x− X¯)ds
]
=
√
1
γ
(
1
N
N∑
i=1
(κ¯− κi)2
)
(T − t)e−κ¯(T−t)(x− X¯). (7.6)
Note that ∂xv∗ ≥ 0, so that the equilibrium volatility is always increased
when small transaction costs are added. This is in line with the asymmetric
information model of [17], the risk-sharing model of [26], numerical results
of [1, 12], and empirical studies such as [24, 27, 41].
In our model, the reason for the increased volatility is that the sign of
the correction term v∗ is determined by x − X¯, so that transaction costs
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amplify the fluctuations of the frictionless equilibrium price (7.4). Let us
now discuss why illiquidity affects price levels in this manner. In view of the
above formula for v∗, adding small transaction costs increases equilibrium
prices when Xt > X¯ and reduces prices for Xt < X¯. If Xt > X¯, agents who
believe in larger than average mean-reversion speeds predict the friction-
less equilibrium price (7.5) to mean-revert downwards towards its long-run
mean. Conversely, agents believing in a lower than average mean-reversion
speed expect the positive trend to continue and prices to rise even further.
Accordingly, the first group of agents wants to sell the asset and the sec-
ond group wants to purchase it. With small transaction costs added, these
trading motives persist, yet changes in portfolios can only be implemented
gradually. Accordingly, agents do not only take into account the difference
between the current value of the state variable and its long-run mean, but
also their expected differences in the future. Since agents believing in faster
mean-reversion expect differences to disappear faster, they have a weaker
motive to act on the trading opportunities they observe. For Xt > X¯, this
means that sellers have a weaker motive to trade than buyers, so that prices
need to rise in order to clear the market. For Xt < X¯, the situation is re-
versed and small transaction costs decrease prices relative to their frictionless
counterparts.
In summary, adding small transaction costs increases prices above the
mean-reversion level and decreases price below it, thereby generating larger
price fluctuations and a larger equilibrium volatility. As optimists and pes-
simists are similarly affected by the costs, the effect of illiquidity on price
levels in our model is ambiguous. Depending on the situation, an increase of
λ can lead to an “illiquidity discount” as observed e.g. in [4], or it may increase
the price as in [20] where illiquidity can be an obstruction to shorting. One
can note that in our example, the correction term v∗ mean-reverts around
zero under each agent’s probability measure. In that sense, the average price
level remains unchanged.
7.3 Holding-Cost Asymptotics
We now turn to the small-holding-cost asymptotics from Section 6. As a first
step, we compute the equilibrium price v0 with vanishing holding costs γ = 0
and fixed transactions costs γ > 0. From (6.1), we have
v0(t, x) =
1
N
N∑
i=1
v0i (t, x),
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where
v0i (t, x) = E
i
t,x[XT ] = X¯ + (x− X¯)e−κi(T−t). (7.7)
By Itô’s formula, agent i believes that this risk-neutral equilibrium price has
dynamics
dv0(t,Xt)
=
1
N
N∑
j=1
(κj − κi)e−κj(T−t)(Xt − X¯)dt+ 1
N
N∑
j=1
e−κj(T−t)σdW it
=
(
κi −
∑N
j=1 κje
−κj(T−t)∑N
j=1 e
−κj(T−t)
)(
X¯ − v0(t,Xt)
)
dt+
1
N
N∑
j=1
e−κj(T−t)σdW it .
The first factor is the difference between κi and a (time-dependent) weighted
average of κ1, . . . , κN . Thus, the interpretation is similar as for the equilib-
rium (7.5) with λ = 0: agents who believe in fast mean reversion observe
a mean-reverting asset price whereas agents believing in slow mean rever-
sion perceive momentum. One can also note that the equilibrium volatility
without holding costs is always larger than or equal to its counterpart with-
out transaction costs. This follows by applying Jensen’s inequality to the
gradients of v0 and (7.4).
We now turn to the leading-order correction term for γ → 0. Again,
the boundedness assumptions in Theorem 6.1 are not satisfied in this ex-
ample, but the arguments in the proof still apply. Accordingly, using the
representation (6.8), we have
v∗(t, x) (7.8)
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
Eit,x
[∫ T
t
T − s
λ
(
v0(s,Xs)− v0i (s,Xs)
)
ds
]
=
1
N
N∑
i=1
∫ T
t
T − s
λ
( 1
N
N∑
j=1
e−κj(T−s) − e−κi(T−s)
)
e−κi(s−t)(x− X¯)ds
=
(x− X¯)(T − t)
λN2
∑
i 6=j
1
κi − κj e
−κj(T−t) − (T − t)(N − 1)
2
N∑
i=1
e−κi(T−t)

where the last equality follows from an elementary but lengthy integration.
The Chebychev sum inequality applied to the second representation shows
that the coefficient multiplying x − X¯ is always negative. Whence, adding
small holding costs increases the risk-neutral equilibrium price when the
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state process Xt is below its mean-reversion level X¯ and decreases it when
Xt > X¯. Since larger holding costs play the same role as lower transaction
costs in our model for a0 = 0, the intuition for this is the converse of the
argument for adding small transaction costs in Section 7.2.
In particular, in view of (7.7), adding small holding costs dampens the
fluctuations of the risk-neutral equilibrium price and accordingly reduces the
equilibrium volatility. This negative effect on the equilibrium volatility and
the positive effect of small transaction costs are consistent with the obser-
vation made above that the equilibrium volatility without transaction costs
always lies below its counterpart with no holding costs. In fact, the exact
equilibrium volatility 1N
∑N
i=1Bi(t) from Section 7.1 smoothly interpolates
between these two extreme cases as γ/λ ranges between ∞ and 0.
7.4 A Calibrated Example
To assess the accuracy of the small-cost asymptotics from Sections 7.2 and
7.3, we now compare the explicit asymptotic formulas (7.6) and (7.8) to
the numerical solutions of the ODEs from Section 7.1 describing the exact
equilibrium price. Throughout, we consider a time horizon of T = 3 years.
To obtain reasonable values for the other model parameters, we cali-
brate the state dynamics (7.3) to USD/EUR exchange rate data from 2009–
2019 available from the website of the St. Louis Fed at https://fred.
stlouisfed.org/series/DEXUSEU. The model parameters can then be es-
timated by matching the first two stationary moments to their empirical
counterparts and fitting the (linear) log-autocorrelation function to the em-
pirical one using linear regression. This leads to
σ = 0.128, X¯ = 1.25, κ¯ = 0.575.
With a zero net supply, this suffices to pin down the equilibrium price without
transaction costs (7.4), since the latter does not depend on the agents’ hold-
ing costs in this case. For the equilibrium prices with transaction costs (7.2),
we additionally need to specify each agent’s individual belief as well as the
transaction cost λ and the holding cost γ. Inspired by similar parameter
values used for commodities and equities in [22, 13], respectively, we use
λ = 10−7 and γ = 10−8.
The free parameter κ1 = 2κ¯−κ2 can in turn be chosen arbitrarily to capture
the agents’ disagreement about the mean-reversion speed of the exchange
rate. For
κ1 = 3κ2 = 0.8625,
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Figure 1: Equilibrium prices (left) and volatilities (right) with both transac-
tion and holding cost (solid), no transaction costs (dotted), and no holding
costs (dashed).
and x = 1, equilibrium asset prices and volatilities are plotted in Figure 1.
These numerical examples clearly display the qualitative properties derived
from the asymptotic formulas in the previous sections. Indeed, the equilib-
rium values with both holding and transaction costs always lie between the
limiting cases where only one of these costs is present. The corresponding
volatility is increased by the trading cost, in line with the discussion in Sec-
tion 7.2, and for Xt = x < X¯ the equilibrium price with transaction costs
lies below its no-transaction cost counterpart.
Figure 1 also clearly shows that the equilibrium price with holding and
transaction costs is much closer to the risk-neutral price than to the friction-
less one. This is not surprising, since γ/λ = 0.1 in this example. Accordingly,
even though the qualitative predictions of both small-cost expansions are
correct, only the small-holding-cost expansion provides useful quantitative
approximations here. As shown in Figure 2, using the first-order correction
term v0 +γv∗− vγ reduces the already small approximation error v0− vγ by
another order of magnitude.
Figure 2: Approximation errors v0 − vγ (left) and v0 + γv∗ − vγ (right).
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